Learning how to learn from failures:the Fukushima nuclear disaster by Labib, Ashraf & Harris, M. J.
1 
 
Learning how to learn from failures: the Fukushima nuclear disaster
1
 
 
Ashraf Labib
*1 
and M.J. Harris
** 
*University of Portsmouth, UK 
**University of Manchester, UK 
1 
Corresponding Author 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Analysis of the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster will show how to learn from failures using 
multi-models.  This type of analysis can enrich the modelling of causal factors, provide 
insight into policy making and support decisions for resource allocations to prevent such 
disasters.  
The analysis presented here is based on a workshop on learning from failures in which 
participants were first given a brief about the related theory, then an introduction to the 
analytical techniques that can be used such as FTA, and RBD. They were then given a brief 
in the form of a narrative of the accident derived from investigation reports and divided into 
small groups tasked to analyse the disaster and to present their recommendations both orally 
and in a written report. 
All the participants were asked to follow a certain presentation format. Firstly there would be 
a technical account of the sequence of events that would be based on research of greater 
depth than provided in the initial summary, one related more to the scope of their analysis. 
This would be followed by a review of the consequences of the accident, a presentation of 
their multi-model analysis of the event and a summary of generic lessons and 
recommendations to prevent future failures of such systems. Finally, collective feedback, 
focused on the generic lessons gained, was offered. 
 
KEYWORDS  
Fukushima, Hydrogen explosion, common mode failure, loss of cooling, design failure, fault 
tree.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the Fukushima disaster few investigation reports, aimed at explaining the 
accident and outlining the lessons learnt, have been published.  Most notably, it has been 
suggested that in the nuclear power industry, probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is under-
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 This research builds on and extends previous work presented at the PSAM Conference, 2014, and in chapter 
9 of Labib (2014). 
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utilized. A report of the Japanese government to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) observed that “…. PSA in risk management has not always been effectively utilized in 
the overall reviewing processes or in risk reduction efforts at nuclear power plants” (Report, 
2011). Moreover, the British Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) final report on Fukushima 
commented that “This [under-utilization of PSA in the nuclear power sector] is an important 
lesson, … effective use of PSA could have helped to prevent accidents like that at Fukushima 
escalating and deal with them should they occur”(Weightman, 2011b).  In the same report the 
final recommendations include “The circumstances of the Fukushima accident have 
heightened the importance of Probabilistic Safety Analysis for all nuclear facilities that could 
have accidents with significant off‐site consequences”. Also responding to the Fukushima 
disaster George Apostolakis of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
has argued that “probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can support a more holistic, 
performance-based safety case, with an appropriate emphasis on systems and components 
that are shown to contribute the most to technological risk” (Apostolakis, 2012).Others have 
also supported the use of PRA approaches in the nuclear industry (Mohagheg and Mosleh, 
20013; Labib, 2013). In this paper the Fukushima disaster is analysed and a hybrid modelling 
approach, using PSA- related techniques, is developed. It is hoped that through the provision 
of an example of PRA/PSA tools used to analyse Fukushima disaster, such analysis can lead 
to the realisation of a learning culture within organizations and governments. 
Although the literature on organizational learning has been well established since the seminal 
work of Cyret and March (1963) and Argyris and Schon (1979), the literature in the field of 
learning from rare events of high severity is largely multi-disciplinary and fragmented (Saleh 
et al, 2010; Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000).  A reason for its being treated as marginal to the 
mainstream research has probably been the perception that such a field of research was a 
statistical outlier (Lampel et al., 2009). Also, there have been few text books on this topic, 
other than those of Turner (1978) on man-made disasters and Kletz (1991) on learning from 
accidents. The fragmentation of the topic has been reflected in the variety of its names, e.g. 
Learning from Incidents, Learning from Disasters, Learning from Major Events and Near 
Misses, and Learning from Crises. Recently, however, there has been a revival of interest and 
research activity,  the Journal of Safety Science dedicating an issue to learning from events 
and near-misses (Carroll and Fahlbruch, 2011) and another to learning from accident reports 
(Dechy et al, 2012), The Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management running an issue 
on learning from crises and major accidents (Deverell and  ans n        and The Journal of 
Organization Science publishing a special on  rare events and organizational 
learning  (Lampel et al., 2009). Also recently published have been reviews of the literature on 
learning from incidents, accidents and disasters (Lindberg et al, 2010; Lukic et al, 2010; Le 
Coze, 2013;   Drupsteen and Guldenmund, 2014).  In a recent work by Saleh et al (2014), an 
excellent analysis of a failure of a defense-in-depth (a concept originated in nuclear industry), 
was studied and applied to the case of BP Texas refinery accident. 
 
After the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents research in learning from failures has 
resulted in recommendations, for becoming learning organizations, specifically addressed to 
the nuclear power sector (IAEA, 2002). Unfortunately, these have not been matched with 
guidance on how this could be achieved (Wahlstrom, 2011).One unique feature of nuclear 
power plants is that they are initially designed for a very long operational life, typically sixty 
years. This poses major challenges such as those of having to cope with technical 
developments, new safety requirements and  sustaining  skills and competencies, over two or 
three generations of staff (Wahlstrom, 2011). 
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The following section is a narrative summarizing the abundance of information in the 
literature on the Fukushima accident. It is suggested that, the disaster having happened a 
while ago, a primary data collection would be of lower quality, as memories have faded and 
key observers have dispersed, and a secondary data analysis (which is a proven and widely 
used research method) is therefore employed for structuring the problem. This also offers the 
possibility of triangulating sources and easy checking by other researchers. The same 
narrative was provided in the workshop conducted by the first author. The participants were 
then divided into groups, each of which was required to scrutinise the literature to find more 
evidence about the disaster and utilize reliability engineering and decision science techniques 
in order to analyse the failure and make recommendations. The background of the 
participants were practitioners from different industries such as oil and gas, power and 
nuclear power generation. They workshop was part of a masters class related to learning from 
failures. They were also initially provided with the theoretical background of the tools used in 
the analysis such as FTA and RBD. 
 
 
1.1 The evolution of the disaster.  On 11 March 2011 Japan suffered its worst ever recorded 
earthquake, known as the Great East Japan Earthquake. It was classified as a seismic 
event of magnitude 9.0, with maximum measured ground acceleration of 0.52g 
(5.07m/s
2
). The epicentre was 110 miles E.N.E. from the Fukushima-1 reactor site, where 
Reactor Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at power. On detection of the earthquake all the 
units shutdown (tripped) safely.  
 
Initially, on-site power was used to provide essential post-trip cooling. About an hour 
after shutdown a massive tsunami, generated by the earthquake, swamped the site and 
took out the AC electrical power capability. Sometime later, alternative back-up cooling 
was also lost. With the loss of these cooling systems Reactor Units 1 to 3 overheated, as 
did a spent-fuel pond in the building containing Reactor Unit 4. This resulted in several 
disruptive explosions, because the overheated zirconium-containing fuel-cladding reacted 
with water and steam and generated a hydrogen cloud which was then ignited. Major 
releases of radioactivity occurred, initially to air but later via leakage to the sea. The 
operators struggled to restore full control.   
 
This was a serious nuclear accident, provisionally estimated to be of Level 5 on the 
Nuclear Event Scale (INES), a figure which was later amended to a provisional Level 7 
(the highest category). The Japanese authorities imposed a 20km radius evacuation zone, 
a 30km sheltering zone and other countermeasures. Governments across the world 
watched with concern and considered how best to protect those of their citizens who were 
residents in Japan from any major radioactive release that might occur (Weightman, 
2011a). 
 
Some have commented on reports of plant damage caused by the earthquake itself, 
concluding that the loss of effective cooling for the reactors stemmed directly from the 
earthquake rather than the subsequent tsunami. However, the information available about 
the emergency cooling systems, and analysis of the circumstances, do not support such a 
hypothesis (Weightman, 2011b). 
 
This case study is a good example of a double-jeopardy, where the combination of 
earthquake and tsunami caused destruction on a scale that was not anticipated in the 
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initial design specifications. For example, the plant was protected by a sea-wall - 
designed to withstand a tsunami of 5.7 meters (19 ft), but the wave that struck the plant 
on March 11 was estimated to have been more than twice that height, at 14 meters (46 ft). 
This, coupled with land movement, ensured that the tsunami caused enormous damage 
along the coast (IMechE, 2011). 
 
1.2 The consequences of the failure. The earthquake, occurring under the sea near the north 
east coast of Japan, lasted over 90 seconds, and caused widespread damage to property, 
although, due to the civil building design standards most structures did not collapse. As a 
result of the earthquake Japan has moved 2.4m laterally, and dropped 1m vertically. Also, 
the earth’s axis has moved  .17m and the length of the earth’s day is now shorter by 1.8 
microseconds (IMechE, 2011). This was by any measure a major global event. The 14m 
high tsunami travelled up to 10km inland, devastating infrastructure already weakened by 
the earthquake. There were approximately 15,000 confirmed deaths and 10,000 people 
remain missing. It has been reported that the accident eventually cost Japan between 5-
7% of its GDP, or US$300-600 billion (Kashyap et al, 2011). 
 
The infrastructure affected included many different types of facility: homes, hospitals, 
electricity and water supplies, petrochemical and oil installations. However, it can be 
argued that the most significant damage, in a global context, was to the Fukushima 
nuclear power station. Fukushima itself is a city in the Tohoku Region of Japan, 
lying250km north of Tokyo and covering an area of 746.43km
2
. As of May 2011, it had a 
population of 290,064.   
 
The damaged caused by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami, which arrived at 15.41 
JST (Weightman, 2011a), resulted in mandatory evacuation of the population within a 
20km radius around the site, loss of containment of radiological material to air, 
contamination in the sea and in drinking water in Japan.  
 
1.3 The Japanese nuclear power industry. Prior to Fukushima disaster, Japan was heavily 
dependent on its nuclear power, with 54 reactors currently in operation:  30 Boiling Water 
(BWR) and 24 Pressurised Water (PWR) reactors. The industry is regulated by the 
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) through the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
(NISA), who are accountable to the government through the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) (Weightman, 2011a). It was the stated goal of the Japanese 
government, prior to this event, that 50% of their electrical power should be nuclear 
(although this, of course, may not continue to be the case). In the short to medium term 
the Japanese government has suspended operations at Tohoku until the sea defences are 
improved, which is estimated could take years to complete. Currently (in 2014), all 
nuclear power plants are stopped for safety enhancement, and some of them are preparing 
for restart by submitting the additional safety analysis to regulatory body.  
 
In an article in the Guardian newspaper (Guardian, 2013) Mr. Naomi Hirose, president of 
the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which runs the Fukushima plant, said 
“nuclear managers should be prepared for the worst" in order to avoid repeating Japan's 
traumatic experience”  and “…we have to keep thinking: what if...” Hirose also said that 
“although the situation facing Fukushima Daiichi on 11 March was exceptional, 
measures could have been adopted in advance that might have mitigated the impact of the 
disaster. TEPCO was at fault for failing to take these steps”. According to him  
“preventative measures included fitting waterproof seals on all the doors in the reactor 
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building, or placing an electricity-generating turbine on the facility's roof, where the 
water might not have reached it. In addition, wrong assumptions were made”  he said. 
Finally he concluded with the following lesson: “What happened at Fukushima was, yes, 
a warning to the world," The resulting lesson was clear: "Try to examine all the 
possibilities, no matter how small they are, and don't think any single counter-measure is 
fool proof. Think about all different kinds of small counter-measures, not just one big 
solution. There's not one single answer. We made a lot of excuses to ourselves … Looking 
back, seals on the doors, one little thing, could have saved everything”. 
 
1.4 Some basic information about risk assessment in the nuclear industry. The 
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was introduced in 1990, and 
updated in 2013 by the IAEA (2013) in order to enable prompt communication of safety 
significant information in the event of nuclear accidents.  
The selection of a level on the INES (see Figure 1), for a given event, is based on three 
parameters: whether people or the environment have been affected; whether any of the 
barriers to the release of radiation have been breached; whether any of the layers of safety 
systems are breached. Broadly speaking, events with consequences only within the affected 
facility itself are usually categorised as 'deviations' or 'incidents' and set below-scale or at 
levels 1, 2 or 3. Events with consequences outside the plant boundary are classified at levels 
4, 5, 6 and 7 and are termed 'accidents'. 
The scale is intended to be logarithmic, similar to the movement magnitude scale that is used 
to describe the comparative magnitude of earthquakes. Each increasing level represents an 
accident approximately ten times more severe than one on the previous level (INES,2013). 
Compared to earthquakes, where the event intensity can be quantitatively evaluated, the level 
of severity of a man-made disaster such as a nuclear accident is more subject to 
interpretation. Because of this the INES level is assigned well after the incident of interest 
occurs. Therefore, the scale has a very limited ability to assist in disaster-aid deployment. 
 
Nuclear reactor incidents/accidents are classified using the following scale (In descending 
order of criticality): 
7 - Major accident (Chernobyl, USSR. 1986;Fukushima, Japan,2011) 
6 - Serious accident 
5 - Accident with wider consequences (Three Mile Island, USA,1979) 
4 - Accident with local consequences (Windscale, UK,1957) 
3 - Serious incident 
2 - Incident 
1 - Anomaly 
0 - Below scale/no safety significance. 
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Figure 1 The INES scale of nuclear accidents (IAEA, 2013) 
Note that up to Level 3 the event is classified as an incident, from Level 4 upwards as an 
accident.  
 
In the next sections the analysis provided by one of the groups are presented.  
 
2. Analysis of one group of participants 
This report discussed the accident and proposed that this loss of control event was due to poor 
design, leading to a common mode failure of the critical system (the cooling water) and the 
installed backup systems, and that there was insufficient provision for alternative cooling 
water supply or for controlled safe pressure relief. This argument was encapsulated in a fault 
tree.  
 
2.1 Technical background. The nuclear plant complex at Fukushima Daiichi was operated 
by TEPCO. It consisted of six BWRs with a combined power output of 4.7 Gigawatts (see 
Table 1) (Weightman, 2011a).  
 
In the case of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP, only unit 3 was operated with mixed oxide (MOX) 
fuel, while the other two reactors under operation were loaded with only uranium-dioxide 
(UO2) fuel at the time of the accident.  In general, BWR can be operated either UO2 fuel or 
mixture of UO2 and plutonium (PuO2) fuel.  The fuel is used to produce heat by nuclear 
fission in the reactor core, the heat being transferred into water to produce steam, the same 
water also being used for the neutron ‘moderation’ essential for the promotion of the fission 
reaction. The steam is conditioned (heated) to ensure it is suitably dry and then used to 
produce electricity via a turbo-generator. The steam is then cooled and condensed, the 
resultant water being returned to the reactor via variable-speed pumps (see Figure2) (Areva, 
201i). 
TABLE 1  Overview of the Fukushima BWR design types and outputs 
(Weightman, 2011a) 
 
7 
 
Unit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Reactor model BWR-3 
(*)
 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-5 
Containment 
model 
Mark 1 Mark 1 Mark 1 Mark 1 Mark 1 Mark 2 
Electrical 
output (MWe) 
460 784 784 784 784 1100 
Commercial 
operation 
1971 1974 1976 1978 1978 1979 
 
(*) Fukushima-1 Unit 1 is an early BWR-3 model that has a number of features of the 
earlier BWR-2 model. 
 
When the earthquake struck, Reactors 1, 2 and 3 were operational and at full output. Reactors 
4, 5 and 6 were not on-line, but were shut down for routine periodic inspection.  
 
2.2 The cooling water system.I rradiated nuclear fuel is self-heating; the radioactive decay 
of the products of nuclear fission releasing energy that ultimately appears as heat. It follows 
that the safe operation of BWR nuclear reactors is dependent on the provision at all times of 
adequate cooling water. Even when a reactor is shut down and the nuclear fission chain 
reaction stopped, the products of the nuclear fissions will be decaying radioactively and 
producing heat.  So, if the cooling water flow is interrupted the water will gradually heat to 
the point of boiling and evaporate. If this is not corrected, the fuel rods, whether in the reactor 
or in the spent (i.e. used) fuel storage pond, will eventually be uncovered, will overheat and 
explosive hydrogen will be produced by the reaction of steam and water with the hot 
zirconium-containing fuel cladding. Finally, the fuel rods will melt, distort, and the melted 
material slump to the bottom of the reactor. 
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Figure 2 Cooling system schematic for a BWR reactor. (Areva, 2011) 
Nuclear facilities which are dependent on cooling water for safe operation have defence in-
depth to ensure operational resilience. The first line of defence is the water driven by the 
variable speed pumps powered by the national grid (i.e. off-site) electricity supply. These 
pumps have operational redundancy in the form of spare pumping capacity. 
If grid power becomes unavailable, sufficient AC alternative generation to power all critical 
equipment is provided by diesel generators connected to the electrical distribution system 
(which constitutes a second line of defence). In addition, battery backup DC power supply 
provides a third line of defence, although this DC power can continue only for as long as the 
batteries last (8 hours in this case). 
 
 
2.3 Overview of the disaster  
Only Reactors 1, 2 and 3 were operational and at full output at the time of the earthquake 
(IMechE, 2011). They successfully shutdown automatically when the earthquake was 
detected but, as explained, the reactor cores continued to produce heat (from the decay of 
fission products) which needed to be removed by continuing cooling water flow.  
 
Due to the earthquake, grid electricity supply to the plant was lost, which led to the 
emergency diesel generators starting. However, when the tsunami struck the generators, 
which were situated below ground level in the lower turbine hall(Weightman, 2011a), 
stopped suddenly as they were overwhelmed by the water surge estimated to be between 4-
6m in height. The plant was now without AC power and reliant on the battery backup 
provision. 
 
Even though replacement diesel generators were obtained and available after 13 hours 
(IMechE, 2011) the connection point to the electrical distribution system was flooded and 
these generators were not usable. Eventually, the battery power was depleted and the plant 
was without any electrical power at all.  
 
The consequence of no power was that the ability to provide cooling water to the plant, 
required for safe continued shutdown, and using the installed pumps, was lost. The cooling 
water present in both the reactor cores and the spent fuel pond was therefore stationary and 
heating led to its evaporation, insufficient level in the reactors and in the spent fuel ponds, 
and increased pressure in the system. In the presence of radiation water suffers from 
radiolytic decay which evolves hydrogen, which under normal circumstances (i.e. flow) is 
removed from the circuit. Under zero flow conditions, however, it builds up. More 
significantly, the fuel was now exposed (not under water). This led to overheating of the 
zirconium cladding, hydrogen evolution (as explained) and migration of radio-active species 
no longer contained by the cladding) into the cooling water system(Weightman, 2011a).  
 
In order to protect the reactor integrity a decision was made to release the pressure in the 
cooling water system. However, due to the intense heat and pressure of the melting reactors, a 
reaction between the nuclear fuel metal cladding and the remaining water surrounding them 
produced explosive hydrogen gas that ignited, which caused significant damage to the reactor 
buildings and released radioactivity to the atmosphere.  
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Attempts to provide alternative cooling continued, including the use of: 
 Fire-fighting equipment/water cannons to spray the building exterior (Weightman, 
2011a) 
 Helicopters to drop water.   
 Portable pumping systems to supply sea water, via a fire hose connection, to the 
cooling circuit. However, the supply rate was limited to ~2m
3
/hr due to limited 
connection size (Weightman, 2011a). 
 
It is now known that during the disaster the radiological containment integrity was degraded. 
Subsequently, radiological measurement has confirmed that contamination spread to the 
atmosphere and then to the sea, and subsequently into drinking water supplies. 
 
2.4 Analysis of contributory factors  
The full picture of the events at Fukushima has yet to become apparent. However, the 
following is a discussion of the contributory factors which also impacted (sometimes 
positively, sometimes not) on cooling, and hence on nuclear safety and plant integrity.  
 
2.4.1 The basis of the design  
The design of Reactor Unit 1, which was the oldest design and suffered the most damage, 
was based upon a 0.18g (1.74m/s
2
) earthquake, which is equivalent to one of magnitude 7.5. 
The March 11
th
earthquake was much more severe at 0.52g (5.07m/s
2
), or magnitude 9.0, 
which in terms of energy is a factor of 1015 greater than the design basis event. But, due to 
the factors of safety built into the design the civil structure survived (IMechE, 2011).  
 
Regarding a tsunami, the design basis was for a 6m wave. The actual wave was 14m. An 
internal TEPCO safety review, in 2007 (around four years prior to the accident), identified 
that the occurrence of a wave that could overtop the seawall was a 1 in 50 year event 
(Krolicki  et al, 2011). Fukushima 1 was under construction in 1967 (44 years ago), and 
therefore the 1 in 50 year estimate was both accurate and equivalent to a once in a plant 
lifetime event. The sea defence, however, had not been improved, and actually fell by 
approximately 1m during the earthquake.  
 
2.4.2 The cooling water system  
The mains power supply was lost during the initial earthquake. Typically, such supply is 
duplicated, protected and provided via diverse routes to allow for catastrophic damage. It was 
initially unclear whether this was the case at Fukushima, i.e. were there two routes and, if so, 
why were they both allowed to be susceptible to the same common mode failure? We now 
know from the investigation report by the Japanese Government (Report, 2011) that at 
Fukushima-Daiichi NPP, the off-site grid was designed based on the general civil-
engineering standard rather than the enhanced safety standard for nuclear facility. That is why 
all off-site grids were damaged by the earthquake.  
 
Initially, the diesel generator system was successfully used when the earthquake led to a loss 
of mains power. However, the location of both the generators and the associated distribution 
board (below ground level) and the lack of appropriate protection, allowed the tsunami to 
overwhelm and damage them beyond use. This could have been avoided by simply locating 
them above the height of any possible tsunami surge.  
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There was no duplicate or alternative connection point for any additional diesel generators, as 
evidence by the fact that some 13 hours later generators were available but not connectable. 
In fact, it was deemed that repairing the mains supply would have been the quickest method 
of re-instating the pump power supply (IMechE, 2011).  
 
No evidence has been identified regarding whether the cooling water systems from the other 
reactors were cross-connectable, i.e. could the cooling water pumps, generators etc. from 
adjacent reactors (in cold shutdown and therefore with spare capacity) be used to cool an 
uncooled reactor? 
 
There were difficulties in providing seawater to the cooling system while the cooling water 
pumps were unavailable. There were deficiencies in the pre-planning and readiness of the 
workforce to use the temporary pumping system commissioned to pump via hose connection 
points. Due to the limits of physical size of the connection the maximum throughput was 
insufficient to achieve the required cooling rates (Weightman, 2011a).  
 
Due to insufficient cooling the pressure rose to unacceptably high levels, requiring venting to 
atmosphere. The safety relief valves were not controllable due to depletion of DC battery, 
which lead to overpressure of reactor vessel and prevented the water injection to reactor core. 
In a documentary about the accident, it states that operators were working in the dark due to 
loss of power supply and had great difficulty in controlling the safety relief valves. 
 
 
2.5 Fault Tree  
It is proposed that the process of evolution of the hydrogen explosion above Fukushima can 
be represented by a Fault Tree, as in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 (a,b,c)   Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of Fukushima Disaster in terms of 
hydrogen explosion and meltdown  
(as proposed by the first group) 
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As shown in Figure 3, the hydrogen explosion and the meltdown were due to three 
simultaneous factors: loss of coolant (ultimate heat sink) – details in Figure 3a; hydrogen 
build-up in cooling water – details in Figure 3b;  ignition– details in Figure 3c. The term 
‘ultimate heat sink’ refers to the function of dissipation of residual heat after a shutdown or 
an accident. Note that in this fault tree model, the most difficult part to assess was figure 3c 
as the relationship between hydrogen explosion and containment vent is not clear yet and 
there are some discrepancies among investigation reports. For example, an alternative view 
argues that the hydrogen leaked mainly through the penetration of containment vessel (e.g., 
top flange) that are degraded by the radiative heat from reactor vessel. 
 
The equivalent Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is shown in Figure 4a .The RBD is a mental 
model that is extracted from the FTA model. The FTA model depends on how one knows 
about the problem and it tends to be the outcome of brainstorming carried out by the 
investigation team. Whereas, the RBD attempts to visualise the relationship among causal 
factors which can lead to identification of vulnerable aspects of the model. 
 
The following rules describe how the RBD can be extracted from the FTA model (Labib, 
2014): 
1. Every OR in an FTA is a Series configuration in the equivalent RBD. 
2. Every AND in an FTA is a Parallel configuration in the equivalent RBD. 
3. Start from the Top of the Tree.  
4. Only model Basic events. 
5. The order in an RBD does NOT matter. 
6. Look for a real root cause. 
7. Both FTA and RBD are mental models for risk analysis rather than risk assessment. 
 
Therefore, every OR gate in the FTA in Figure 3 is mapped into a ‘series’ structure in the 
RBD and every AND gate into a ‘parallel’ structure. So one would expect that an RBD with a 
majority of series structure to be ‘bad news’  as any box fails  the whole system will collapse. 
Whereas  an RBD model with prevailing parallel arrangements to be ‘good news’ as there is 
much redundancy in the system.  
 
Note here that the term ‘failure’ in the title of the present paper and throughout the text 
implies a major failure (a disaster).  However, the techniques of FTA and RBD were 
originally designed to analyse failures at equipment level; for example a failure of a gas 
turbine, pump or compressor. We have utilised these techniques for the analysis of 
Fukushima as well as other disasters (Labib, 2014). Therefore, we argue in this paper that the 
same techniques can be used for analysis of any failure despite its scale.  
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Figure 4a: Proposed RBD of Fukushima Nuclear Disaster for the first group (ideal 
scenario). 
 
Notice that in Figure 4a, the system at the first instance the system looks to be of a safe 
structure as there are plenty of parallelism in the structure and hence the smiley face. 
 
What has actually happened in this disaster is a failure that has affected all parallel structures 
as shown in Figure 4b, as depicted by the shaded boxes in the diagram. 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
Figure 4b: Proposed RBD of Fukushima Nuclear Disaster for the first group (actual 
scenario). 
 
2.6 Discussion of the group of participants.  
This serious accident was fundamentally down to poor design, in that the normal mains and 
both backup power supplies were allowed to fail due to a single common cause, albeit an 
extreme natural event. The mains supply integrity was such that the earthquake damaged it 
beyond repair and no diverse supply remained intact. The diesel generator system was located 
in a plant room likely to be swamped, and again no diverse connection point remained. And 
finally, neither could be repaired before the backup power supply was exhausted. The threat 
from an earthquake-generated tsunami that could overcome the existing sea defences, and 
would therefore be capable of these effects, was not only plausible and real, it was actually 
foreseen in 2007 and calculated as likely in the lifetime of the plant (Krolicki etal, 2011). But 
the plant continued to be operated, the sea defences were not improved, and the resilience of 
the cooling water system was not increased.  
 
Furthermore, the ability to provide cooling by other means was insufficient both with respect 
to the training and readiness to do so, and also as regards the physical hardware required. 
Without the installed pumps not enough water could be provided - by any other installed 
emergency system - to prevent the pressure rising to unacceptable levels (Weightman, 
2011a).  
 
The ability of the installed design to control, contain and direct excessive pressure was 
insufficient. The basic concept of reinforced containment vent is to use the atmosphere as an 
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ultimate heat sink by releasing the overly pressured gas and water vapour inside the primary 
containment vessel (PCV).  The containment represents the largest barrier to the release of 
radioactive elements to the environment and should not be allowed to fail at any cost. 
Therefore, the planned response to an event like this is to vent some of the steam to the 
atmosphere just to keep the pressure under control (MIT, 2011). From this perspective, the 
outside atmosphere is "the suitable location" to release the gas and water vapour from reactor 
containment vessel. This is a planned procedure since it involves a process of scrubbing and 
filtering the released material through the effect caused by the water in the suppression 
chamber, which contribute to the reduction of the amount of radioactive material released 
during the containment vent by the factor of 10-100. While some of these gases are 
radioactive, they did not pose a significant risk to public safety to even the workers on site. 
This procedure is justified as its consequences are very low, especially when compared to the 
potential consequences of risking the integrity of the containment structure (MIT, 2011).  
 
Given that the possibility of such a large tsunami was foreseen, it follows that its 
consequences were also foreseeable via a suitable FMEA. Therefore, the failure to carryout 
suitable hazard analysis, and to implement the actions thus identified, was also a design 
failure. 
 
2.7  Conclusion of the group of participants 
The event was foreseen and design shortcomings were neither investigated nor addressed. 
This aspect of the disaster, the hydrogen explosions, was fundamentally due to the lack of 
resilience of the cooling water circuit.  
 
 
3. DISCUSSION:  
Here, the tutors (the authors) offered feedback to the groups, intended to provide more insight 
into the accident, the company and its culture, and hence addressing various specific and 
generic issues. This view here can be considered also as a third view (after the narrative, and 
the group’s report  so as to add to the richness of the topic being discussed. 
3.1 Overall criticism of the group  
 
It is clear from the FTA that the main causal factor was the initial poor design specifications, 
especially those related to the height of the sea walls, and the installed backup systems (in 
that there was insufficient provision for alternative cooling water supply or for controlled safe 
pressure relief. 
3.2 Wider generic lessons for the nuclear power industry 
On a more strategic level the nuclear power generation debate concerns the issue of 
regulation.  Pfotenhauer et al.( 2012)  and Aoki and Rothwell (2013) have proposed that the 
time has come to introduce a Japanese and a global independent nuclear safety commission, 
in order to separate national economic and political interests from the regulatory function, in 
promoting nuclear power, something which concerns all nations. Accordingly, it has been 
recommended that the mandate of the IAEA should be elevated to include a licensing 
function for nuclear power plants, thereby changing its status from an advisory body to that 
of an international institution with authority to make legally binding decisions. This is in line 
with the findings of this paper, since it was noticed that the root causes for the disaster can be 
attributed to two main factors, viz. deficiencies in regulation and inadequate setting of design 
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specifications based on risk assessment. Regarding the second of these it can be claimed that 
more research is needed in this field, where the emphasis should shift from ‘probability’ 
assessment to ‘possibility’ identification.  Currently, the ‘P’ in PRA and PSA stands for 
‘probabilistic’.  Mathematically, it is easier to formalise ‘probability’ than ‘possibility’, 
despite the fact that it is now clear, from Fukushima, that the main challenge concerns 
possibility, hence a paradigm shift is needed to conduct more research on modelling 
possibility. 
In order to demonstrate how it can be misleading to just rely on probability with assumptions 
that are more aspirational than fact-based, let us apply this to the nuclear power generation 
industry. To test for a probability of a less than one in ten million chance per reactor-year of a 
nuclear plant failure would require building 1,000 reactors and operating them for 10,000 
years and anticipating a failure of no more than one during that period. 
Now let us compare these ambitious estimates with the current state. Across the world there 
are about 435 nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries, with over 140 in Europe, and 
54 in Japan (Weightman, 2011), and around 100 in the USA. Fukushima is the third major 
nuclear accident (i.e. it was preceded by Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) and all three 
happened within less than half a century, which makes us question our models and original 
assumptions. So the current record suggests that the Mean Time between Failures (MTBF) 
for the three major accidents (in 1979, 1986, and 2011) currently stands at just 10 years, 
which is very far from the ambitious 1 in a 10 million per reactor-year chance. This view is 
supported by Smythe (2011), who also suggests a catastrophic accident to be expected every 
12-15 years. Clearly, the three accidents each arose from very different circumstances, 
invalidating various modelling and risk assessment assumptions, and resisting assimilation 
into a single data set. It is difficult, with such a small sample size, to make generalizations 
about where current risk models fail, though we agree with the argument put forward by 
Pfotenhauer et al (2012) which suggests that the original ambitious annual failure risk 
estimates were serious underestimates. 
 
In an article titled ‘Learning lessons from Fukushima’ Mike Weightman, who was the UK 
Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations, and head of an IAEA fact-finding mission, 
concluded that “The Magnitude-9 earthquake caused severe ground motions that lasted for 
several minutes at the Daiichi plant. The measured motions reasonably matched the 
predictions of the designers of the seismic protection measures. Upon detection of these 
ground motions, the safety systems at Daiichi shut down the reactors and started the back-up 
systems. All the evidence I have seen, including from the other Japanese nuclear power 
plants that witnessed similar ground motions, supports the view that the Daiichi plant safely 
survived this massive earthquake. However, the flood protection measures at the Daiichi 
plant were originally designed to withstand a 3.1m high tsunami, whereas the largest wave 
that crashed into the site in March inundated it to around 15m. A review in 2002 by the 
operators of the Daiichi plant did result in increases to the tsunami defences to enable it to 
better survive a 5.7m high tsunami. This improvement still proved to be inadequate, 
especially considering the history of tsunamis along that coast over the past century” 
(Weightman, 2012). 
 
These accounts show the importance of the previous stated recommendations, that the 
mandate of the IAEA should be elevated to include a licensing function for nuclear power 
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plants, thereby changing its status from an advisory body to that of an international institution 
with authority to make legally binding decisions. 
On the other hand, when one looks at other sources of energy, nuclear power is one of the 
safest based on the criteria of lost life per GWh and CO2 emissions, and when compared to 
alternative energy sources such as coal, oil and even photovoltaic, hydro and wind (Nuclear 
Energy Outlook, 2008; Simic et al 2011). 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION: 
In any process industry, and especially in nuclear energy, failure can be attributed to one of 
two main reasons:  either a design integrity failure or an operational and maintenance failure. 
Fukushima was clearly caused by the former rather than the latter. Its impact was limited, 
because of the Japanese safety procedures to which we should pay tribute. However, it is 
clear that the design of the plant did not include a sufficient factor of safety, which has been 
attributed to inadequate regulations. 
Overall, this study demonstrates, using the case of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, that both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches are important techniques, which are useful for gaining 
better insight into the analysis of risk at different levels. This is in line with what Apostolakis 
(2004) has previously proposed and is also in line with what all investigation reports have 
called for in the wake of this disaster. 
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